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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of recorded history, human beings have looked up at the
sky and studied its occupants.1 In the words of Leonardo da Vinci,
“Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your
eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will al-
ways long to return.”2 The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918
(MBTA),3 a United States federal law passed to implement a treaty
between Great Britain (on behalf of Canada)4 and the United States,5
is no exception to this desire to examine and protect the creatures of
the sky.6 Almost one hundred years after President Woodrow Wilson
1. See generally VALÉRIE CHANSIGAURD, ALL ABOUT BIRDS: A SHORT ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF ORNITHOLOGY (3d ed. 2010) (detailing the history of the study of
birds).
2. See Roland Flamini, The Da Vinci Codex: Treasured Sketches of Flight on Rare
Display at Smithsonian, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.washington-
times.com/news/2013/sep/12/the-da-vinci-codex-treasured-sketches-of-flight-on
[https://perma.unl.edu/ABW7-LT8U].
3. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012); Convention Between the United
States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United
States and Canada, Gr. Brit.–U.S., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter
U.S.–Great Britain Treaty].
4. The U.S.–Great Britain Treaty involves an agreement between Canada and the
United States. However, it was enacted by Great Britain because at that point in
history Canada was a province of Great Britain. See generally Peter Oliver, Ca-
nada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 519 (1999)
(detailing aspects of the history of Canadian relations with Great Britain).
5. See U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3.
6. For more information regarding the United States’ agreements with foreign na-
tions concerning the protection of migratory birds, see the Convention Between
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the
Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.–U.S.S.R., Nov. 19,
1976, 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter U.S.–U.S.S.R. Convention]; the Convention Be-
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signed it, the Act still attempts to safeguard certain birds that migrate
into American territories.7 Due to its status as one of the oldest envi-
ronmental conservation acts in America, the MBTA has been repeat-
edly amended and expanded in modern times to include subsequently
enacted treaties protecting migratory birds with not only Canada but
also Mexico, Japan, and Russia.8
Congress passed the MBTA to shield certain birds from human in-
terference—the Act criminalizes the taking or killing of nearly one
thousand species.9 Put most simply, it attempts to facilitate interna-
tional cooperation by protecting migratory birds that travel long dis-
tances across many different countries.10 To encourage compliance
with the statute, Congress granted the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
statutory authority to investigate and sanction MBTA violators.11
Since its implementation, however, application of the MBTA has
been polluted by conflicting judicial interpretations.12 Specifically, a
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction,
and Their Environment, Japan–U.S., Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter
U.S.–Japan Convention]; and the Convention Between the United States of
America and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals,
Mex.–U.S., Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter U.S.–Mexico Convention].
7. See Jennifer Howard, Celebrating the Migratory Bird Treaty, A Pact that Tran-
scends Borders, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY (Aug. 15, 2016), https://abcbirds.org/cele-
brating-the-migratory-bird-treaty-a-pact-that-transcends-borders [https://perma
.unl.edu/72X8-WYGR].
8. See U.S.–U.S.S.R. Convention, supra note 6; U.S.–Japan Convention, supra note
6; U.S.–Mexico Convention, supra note 6.
9. 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (2013) (providing the list of protected migratory birds). See gen-
erally 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (supplying the beginning of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act’s codified language, which provides the legal authority for § 10.13).
10. See U.S.–U.S.S.R. Convention, supra note 6; U.S.–Japan Convention, supra note
6; U.S.–Mexico Convention, supra note 6; U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note
3; Howard supra note 7.
11. See § 701 (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to adopt such measures as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act . . . .”).
12. District- and appellate-court decisions demonstrate this confusion. Some have
held that incidental killings of protected birds are sufficient to violate the misde-
meanor provision of the MBTA. See United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611
F.3d 679, 691 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding Apollo would be liable for incidentally
killing the protected birds if it had foreseen that the birds might get caught in the
oil drilling equipment); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that killing migratory birds unintentionally with wastewater vio-
lated the MBTA); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 532
(E.D. Cal.) (holding killing protected migratory birds as a consequence of misus-
ing pesticide violated the MBTA), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1978); see also United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070,
1076–77 (D. Colo. 1999) (holding that an electric company that failed to install
equipment on its poles, causing the deaths of protected birds, was guilty of violat-
ing the MBTA even though it was not an intentional act associated with hunting
or poaching). Others have held that only direct killings constitute violations. See
United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir.
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federal circuit split has developed regarding the proper interpretation
of the word “take” under § 703(a) of the MBTA for purposes of misde-
meanor violations.13 Some circuit courts have held that under the Act,
taking a bird only includes a direct, affirmative action by a human,
like hunting.14 In contrast, others have interpreted take to mean not
only direct interaction but also incidental interference with the
birds.15 These inconsistent rulings result in widely different judicial
outcomes depending on where the violator injured the MBTA-pro-
tected bird.
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit further
divided the federal circuits on this issue when, in early September
2015, it reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas’s decision convicting CITGO Petroleum Corporation of three vi-
olations of the MBTA.16 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that
those who unintentionally kill migratory birds were not taking17 the
2015) (declining to adopt a broad reading of the MBTA); Newton Cty. Wildlife
Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115–16 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Strict liability
may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers. But it would
stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe it as an
absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indi-
rectly results in the death of migratory birds.”); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans,
952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that those who did not intend to kill
migratory birds can be sanctioned under the MBTA, but killing birds indirectly
by destroying their habitat is beyond the meaning of the Act); United States v.
Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d. 1202, 1212–13 (D.N.D. 2012) (narrowly
reading the MBTA by holding direct killing of migratory birds constitutes a viola-
tion and explaining that all other incidental killings of the birds were not MBTA
violations).
13. Section 703(a) of the MBTA states:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter pro-
vided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means
or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take,
capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, order
to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause
to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, trans-
port or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for
shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any
part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manu-
factured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such
bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . .
16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
14. See CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 492; Newton Cty., 113 F.3d at 115–16; Brigham Oil,
840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212–13; cf. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 303 (holding
that unintentional killing or taking of migratory birds are MBTA violations but
indirectly taking a migratory bird’s habitat, therefore causing its death, is not a
violation even if multiple protected birds die as a result of the habitat
destruction).
15. See Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 691; FMC Corp., 578 F.2d at 259–60; Corbin
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 529–32.
16. See CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 494.
17. Id. at 492–93.
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animals as defined by the Act. Therefore, in the Fifth Circuit’s view,
CITGO Petroleum did not violate the MBTA when it failed to cover its
oil tanks, causing migratory birds to fall in and drown.18 This decision
not only absolved the corporation of a fine and three misdemeanor
convictions,19 it also effectively condoned a hazardous industry prac-
tice by making it clear that unintentional omissions resulting in the
death of the protected birds were not criminal under the MBTA.
This Note focuses on the weaknesses of the Fifth Circuit’s decision
to interpret the misdemeanor section of the MBTA to penalize only
those who affirmatively cause protected birds to die. This Note further
argues that the Fifth Circuit should adopt a broader rule regarding
MBTA sanctions in order to penalize both direct and incidental killing
of migratory birds. Part II of this Note provides background informa-
tion about the history and language of the MBTA, the details of the
current circuit split, and an explanation of the Fifth Circuit’s decision.
Part III argues that the expansive language of the MBTA supports a
broader interpretation of the MBTA. It then examines congressional
intent surrounding the Act, which reinforces adopting a rule that in-
cludes sanctions beyond direct killings of protected birds through
hunting and other affirmative acts. Finally, Part III concludes by re-
flecting on the policy considerations that support expanding MBTA
sanctions to include incidental killing. Part IV provides a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND: IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, A BIRD IN THE
HAND IS WORTH ZERO MBTA CITATIONS
For hundreds of years, birds remained virtually unprotected from
human slaughter for food, trade, and sport.20 As the twentieth century
approached, however, the consequences of failing to prevent the ex-
tinction of entire species of animals became more apparent.21 This re-
alization resulted in government-imposed conservation initiatives to
protect animals facing this threat.22 On both national and interna-
18. Id. at 493.
19. Id.
20. See Benjamin Barca et. al., Environmentalism in the Crosshairs: Perspectives on
Migratory Bird Hunting and Poaching Conflicts in Italy, 6 GLOBAL ECOLOGY &
CONSERVATION 189, 190–92 (2016) (explaining the longstanding issue concerning
the killing of migratory birds in the Mediterranean); see also Luke Dale-Harris,
The Massacre of Europe’s Songbirds, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.news-
week.com/2015/02/13/massacre-europes-songbirds-304716.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/LW8D-7REB] (demonstrating that hunting and killing birds for these
reasons remains a problem).
21. George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 168 (1978).
22. Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1178 (2008) (explain-
ing that “[p]ublic shock over [the] rapid decline of many migratory bird species”
led to attempts by Congress to pass environmental-protection legislation).
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tional stages, the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty is a notable example of
the United States’ efforts to help ensure environmental sustainability.
The MBTA, which is Congress’s statutory implementation of the
U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, commands that “it shall be unlawful at
any time, by any means or in any manner, to . . . kill . . . any migratory
bird.”23 On its face, this language appears straightforward; neverthe-
less, several circuit courts stand divided on whether the Act criminal-
izes incidental as well as direct killings of migratory birds.24
A. God Save the Birds: The History of United States
Environmental Protection Legislation and the
U.S.–Great Britain Treaty
Even though the MBTA became law nearly one hundred years ago,
it was not America’s first attempt to implement legislation geared to-
ward conservation. Before Congress executed the U.S.–Great Britain
Treaty by passing the MBTA, it adopted two other pieces of legisla-
tion: the Lacey Act and the Weeks–McLean Act.25 As MBTA predeces-
sors, these legislative initiatives help illustrate Congress’s larger and
long-standing agenda to regulate human interference with protected
migratory birds.26
Using its Commerce Clause authority, Congress passed the Lacey
Act in 1900, which imposed criminal sanctions on hunters who at-
tempt to break certain states’ conservation laws.27 In particular, the
Lacey Act existed to punish those who illegally hunted wildlife in one
state and then traveled with the animal across state borders to a dif-
ferent jurisdiction to avoid penalties.28 When Congress passed this
Act, it intended to give the states enforcement power over their envi-
ronmental-protection laws by extending to each state the power to
sanction poachers beyond state lines.29 However, even though courts
have deemed the Lacey Act constitutional,30 the law initially had little
23. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
24. Compare United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010),
with CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 477.
25. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 21, at 169–74 (outlining the history of Congress’s
environmental legislation leading up to the MBTA, including the Lacey Act,
which gave states jurisdiction to penalize poachers that carry birds outside of
their state borders, and the Weeks–McLean Act, which stated that all migratory
birds were under U.S. control and custody).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Victor J. Rocco, Wildlife Conservation Under the Lacey Act, 80 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J.
10, 12 (2008).
29. Id.
30. See Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight
Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36–53 (1995)
(discussing in detail the amendments of the Lacey Act and the early history of
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effect because it was rarely enforced.31 Nevertheless, its focus on
preventing violators who poach wildlife closely mirrors the MBTA’s
goal to protect migratory birds from excessive hunting.32
Despite the Lacey Act’s practical failure, Congress persisted with
its mission to protect migratory birds by implementing the
Weeks–McLean Act, a broader national-conservation law that de-
clared migratory animals to be “within the custody and protection of
the Government of the United States.”33 The Act asserted that pro-
tected birds “shall not be destroyed or taken contrary to [the Act’s]
regulations.”34 Beyond preventing hunting, it also attempted to stop
poachers from shipping migratory birds across state lines,35 in part to
dissuade violators from selling the protected birds’ feathers to
merchants for decoration on hats.36 Like its predecessor the Lacey
Act, the Weeks–McLean Act focused on regulating certain hunting ac-
tivity involving protected birds.37 However, its enforcement strategy
differed from the Lacey Act because it redistributed “responsibility
over migratory birds from individual state governments to the federal
government and sought to remedy the tragedy of the commons that
was created when an individual state’s conservation efforts were un-
done by excessive harvest and mismanagement by the state’s
bounds.”38
States’-rights activists, however, disliked Congress’s attempt to
transfer regulatory power over the birds to the federal government,
thereby divesting the states of enforcement power over birds in their
territory.39 As a result, the Weeks–McLean Act barely made it beyond
the floor of Congress before two district courts demurred due to the
Act’s bold language.40 Shortly after, the Supreme Court granted a writ
litigation); Rocco, supra note 28, at 12 (observing that the Lacey Act has been
consistently upheld as constitutional).
31. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 22, at 1178.
32. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (making it clear that it is unlawful to hunt
a protected migratory bird).
33. Austin Williams, The Pacific Salmon Treaty: Historical Analysis and Prescription
for the Future, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 153, 182–83 (2007) (quoting Weeks–Mc-
Lean Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828 (1913), superseded by statute, 16
U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)).
34. Other Relevant Laws, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/pol-
icies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/other-relevant-laws.php#weeks [https://
perma.unl.edu/2U2G-KA9F] (last updated Oct. 17, 2016).
35. Coggins, & Patti, supra note 21, at 169.
36. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 22, at 1178.
37. Id. at 1178–79.
38. Williams, supra note 33, at 182–83.
39. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 293 (D. Kan. 1915) (“The power of a
state to control and regulate the taking of game cannot be questioned.” (citing
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896))).
40. See id. at 296; United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914); see also
Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 MO. L. REV. 1007,
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of certiorari to analyze the constitutionality of Congress’s authority to
pass a law that declared all migratory birds property of the United
States.41
Despite challenges to the Weeks–McLean Act, some members of
Congress insisted on passing a law meant to protect migratory birds.
As such, before the Supreme Court determined the Weeks–McLean
Act’s constitutionality, bird-conservation advocates within Congress
silenced objectors by replacing the Weeks–McLean Act with a similar
law—the MBTA—using Congress’s well-established treaty power.42
To date, the MBTA has never been successfully challenged.43 It cele-
brates its hundredth birthday in 2018. The law’s historic place in
American law evidences the United States’ long-standing commitment
to conservation.44 Further, the Executive and Legislative Branches’
willingness to utilize the complex treaty method to overcome constitu-
tional attacks45 demonstrates their persistent desire to promote
conservation.
Early in the Treaty’s provisions, the United States and Great Brit-
ain proclaim that certain migratory birds “are of great value as a
source of food or in destroying insects which are injurious to forests
and . . . to agricultural crops” and acknowledged that they “are never-
theless in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection
during the nesting season or while on their way to and from their
breeding grounds.”46 To diminish the vulnerability of these valuable
birds, the Treaty states that it would create “some uniform system of
protection” to safeguard the endangered animals.47 Because the
MBTA’s aim is to implement the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, the lan-
guage within the Treaty regarding its general purpose provides the
foundation for the MBTA’s intent. To establish its objectives, the
Treaty’s provisions define which species are protected by the agree-
ment and expressly prohibit hunting the protected animals during
certain times of the year.48
In the United States, however, merely ratifying the U.S.–Great
Britain Treaty, as President Wilson did when he signed it and ex-
1009 (2008) (explaining the states’ reaction to the Weeks–McLean Act and its
failed enforcement).
41. See Collette L. Adkins Giese, Spreading Its Wings: Using the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act to Protect Habitat, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1157, 1160 n.20 (2010).
42. Swaine, supra note 40, at 1009; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012) (providing the
legislation that implemented  the Treaty).
43. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the MBTA as a permissible use of Congress’s treaty power).
44. See U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, proclamation.
45. See Lilley & Firestone, supra note 22, at 1179.
46. U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, proclamation.
47. Id. para. 4.
48. Id. arts. I–II.
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changed documents with Great Britain,49 does not necessarily make it
binding law. While “[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions,”50 treaties are merely negotiated by the President on behalf of
the United States and are not made enforceable without the advice
and consent of the Senate.51 Further, even after the Senate gives its
consent, some treaties “do not by themselves function as binding fed-
eral law” but instead require additional congressional approval
through legislation to have legal effect.52 The MBTA is an example of
a piece of treaty-implementing legislation passed by Congress that
makes the objectives of the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty enforceable in
the United States.53
B. No Clear Skies Ahead: The Relevant Sections of the
MBTA
Not long after Congress passed the MBTA and implemented the
U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, the Act faced attacks from states’-rights
supporters.54 Despite opposition, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
MBTA’s constitutionality in Missouri v. Holland when it held federal
enforcement of the Act within state borders did not violate Missouri’s
Tenth Amendment rights.55 This decision made it clear that treaties
entered into by the federal government are considered supreme law of
the land if implemented properly; thus, federal law implementing
treaties overrides conflicting administrative custom or state law.56
Although the MBTA is constitutionally sound, circuit courts stand
divided on whether the MBTA’s undoubtedly broad language
criminalizes not only affirmative acts but also incidental human inter-
ference with protected birds.57 According to the Act’s own language,
§ 703(a) of the MBTA declares that:
It shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for
sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for ship-
49. See U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, art. IX.
50. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall); see United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur . . . .”).
52. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008).
53. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012) (providing the statutory authority for imple-
menting the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty).
54. Coggins & Patti, supra note 21, at 174.
55. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
56. Coggins & Patti, supra note 21, at 174.
57. See § 703. Compare United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th
Cir. 2010), with United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d
477, 488 (5th Cir. 2015).
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ment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver
for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be
carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any mi-
gratory bird . . . .58
Upon passing this section, Congress tasked the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service with determining whether a protected bird has been
taken pursuant to § 703(a) and charging such perpetrators accord-
ingly.59 Offenders of § 703(a) may be sanctioned under any of the
MBTA’s penalty sections—§§ 704,60 707(a),61 and 707(b).62 Section
707(a) provides for misdemeanor violations and states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, partner-
ship, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said conventions or of
this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation
made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be impris-
oned not more than six months, or both.63
On its face, § 707(a) does not include a mens rea requirement for
misdemeanor convictions. As such, federal circuit courts have inter-
preted Congress’s silence on mental culpability to mean that Congress
intended misdemeanor perpetrators to be held strictly liable for viola-
tions.64 Indeed, federal circuits are not in disagreement regarding
whether § 707(a) calls for strict liability; rather, they disagree regard-
ing which types of actions § 707(a)’s strict liability standard applies
to.65 Some federal circuits have held that only hunting activities fall
under this strict liability standard.66 Other circuits disagree, holding
that strict liability extends beyond hunting to indirect and unintended
killings of the protected birds for purposes of MBTA misdemeanor
violations.67
58. § 703(a).
59. See 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to adopt
such measures as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.”).
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing the statutory language for MBTA violations
relating to baiting birds, which is not related to the misdemeanor section dis-
cussed in this Note).
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012) (providing the statutory language for MBTA misde-
meanor convictions).
62. See § 707(b) (stating that knowledge is required for a felony conviction under the
MBTA).
63. § 707(a).
64. Courts agree that § 707(a) imposes strict liability. See, e.g., United States v.
CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010).
65. Compare CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 488–89, with Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 682.
66. See, e.g., CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 490.
67. See, e.g., Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 679.
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C. Walking on Eggshells: The Federal Circuits Disagree on
Whether Incidental Killings May Be Sanctioned
Under the MBTA
Since the Supreme Court upheld the MBTA’s constitutionality,
courts across the country have struggled with the task of interpreting
§§ 703(a) and 707(a).68 Section 703(a), which is the general statutory
provision that renders taking or killing protected migratory birds un-
lawful, does not include a mens rea requirement. Instead, it simply
instructs that “unless and except as permitted by regulation . . . it
shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to
 . . . kill . . . any migratory bird.”69 Further, the Act’s misdemeanor
provision, which is included in § 707(a), is also silent concerning the
mental culpability required to justify penalties. Rather, it merely
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, partner-
ship, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said conventions or of
this Act, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation made pur-
suant to this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $ 15,000 or be imprisoned not more than
six months, or both.70
As a result of Congress’s silence, several courts disagree about the
scope of this strict liability standard for misdemeanors—specifically,
circuits diverge regarding whether misdemeanor liability extends only
to activities associated with hunting or whether it can also be ex-
tended to incidental takings of these birds. A long string of federal
court opinions demonstrates this confusion,71 resulting in inconsistent
enforcement of the MBTA across jurisdictions.
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits have
adopted a broad interpretation of the Act, holding that violators can be
sanctioned for taking a protected bird under the MBTA either through
incidental killings (for instance, by way of hazardous industry prac-
tices) or by more direct methods, such as hunting.72 In United States
v. FMC Corp., for example, the Second Circuit considered an appeal
68. See CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 488.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012); see also Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a Solution: Inci-
dental Takings Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2013) (“The result has been the uneven enforcement of the
MBTA’s prohibitions, legal uncertainty for potential violators, lack of universal
compliance with voluntary guidelines and steadily escalating bird deaths.”).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012).
71. See Ogden, supra note 69, at 15–28 (providing a lengthy discussion regarding the
federal-circuit split surrounding the interpretation of the words take and kill for
purposes of misdemeanor MBTA violations).
72. See generally, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 691 (10th
Cir. 2010) (holding Apollo would be liable of incidentally killing the protected
birds if it had foreseen that the birds might get caught in the oil drilling equip-
ment); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that
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filed by FMC Corporation after a district court convicted it of MBTA
violations for killing protected birds by accidentally poisoning them
with a small amount of toxic waste water stored in a pond.73 The court
acknowledged that the corporation did not intend to kill the birds and
had even taken a number of preventative measures to keep the pro-
tected birds away from the toxic pond.74 Nevertheless, it held the com-
pany strictly liable for killing the birds in violation of the MBTA.75 In
the Second Circuit’s view, because the MBTA lacks a mens rea re-
quirement for misdemeanor convictions in its plain language, the
proper interpretation of the Act is one that imposes strict liability re-
gardless of whether the birds’ deaths were incidental.76 Put differ-
ently, the corporation’s good intentions and preventative actions were
meaningless for the purpose of the MBTA violations because “FMC
engaged in an activity involving the manufacture of a highly toxic
chemical; and FMC failed to prevent this chemical from escaping into
the ponding and killing birds.”77
In line with this logic, in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.,78
the Tenth Circuit applied this broad strict liability test to oil-drill op-
erators when MBTA-protected birds were found inside drilling equip-
ment.79 More specifically, the court held that the MBTA’s language
endorsed strict liability because “[t]he Act declares it a misdemeanor
to ‘pursue, hunt, take, capture, [or] kill’ birds protected by several in-
ternational treaties”80 without requiring “any particular mental state
or mens rea to violate the statute.”81 The court provided additional
support for this holding by discussing fairness, notice, and causation
at length.82
In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth83 and Eighth Cir-
cuits have adopted a narrow interpretation of the Act’s language,
holding that taking the migratory birds included only deaths resulting
as a consequence of purposeful acts directed at the wildlife when hunt-
ing.84 Notably, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has refused
killing migratory birds unintentionally with wastewater was a violation of the
MBTA).
73. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 904.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 908.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 611 F.3d 679, 681–82 (10th Cir. 2010).
79. Id. at 682.
80. Id. at 681 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2006)).
81. Id. at 681–82.
82. Id. at 686–90
83. See infra section II.D.
84. See generally United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477,
489 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that the only way a human can “reduce an animal to
human control” is by killing or capturing it, not “accidentally or by omission
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to extend MBTA misdemeanor penalties to include incidental killings
because, in its view, such an interpretation is not supported by the
Act’s language or history.85 In Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. United
States Forest Service, it held that a logging company whose practices
risked both disturbing migratory birds’ nests and killing the protected
animals could not be sanctioned under the MBTA.86 While the court
agreed with the Second and Tenth Circuits that the absence of a mens
rea requirement in the Act’s language imposed strict liability on of-
fenders, it held that this stringent standard only applied to hunting
and poaching the migratory birds and not to those who incidentally
killed them.87 The court supported its decision by reasoning that
“ ‘take’ and ‘kill’ in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly
a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.’”88
Although the Second and Tenth Circuits oppose the interpretations
of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits regarding which actions establish un-
lawfully taking a MBTA-protected bird, they are not the only circuits
that have addressed the issue. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
the MBTA provides further confusion. In Seattle Audubon Society v.
Evans, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that omis-
sions do not constitute MBTA violations but applied this holding only
to the narrow realm of habitat destruction.89 In this case, the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management were charged with un-
lawfully taking owl habitats in violation of the MBTA because their
logging practices involved lands housing northern spotted owls.90 In
the court’s words, existing Ninth Circuit case law that imposed penal-
ties on those who incidentally killed migratory birds with pesticides
“[did] not suggest that habitat destruction, leading indirectly to birds
deaths, amount[ed] to the ‘taking’ of migratory birds within the mean-
ing of the [MBTA].”91 In other words, although some incidental kill-
[but] . . . affirmatively”); Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d
110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with
hunters and poachers. But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct,
such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory
birds.”); United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d. 1202, 1211
(D.N.D. 2012); cf. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 304 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding those who did not intend to kill migratory birds can be sanctioned
under the MBTA when they accidentally poison the birds using pesticides, but
also holding killing birds secondarily by destroying their habitat is beyond the
meaning of the Act).
85. See Newton Cty., 113 F.3d at 115.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302).
89. 952 F.2d at 298.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 303.
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ings are MBTA violations in the Ninth Circuit, the court believed
habitat destruction92 stretched the Act’s misdemeanor liability too
far.93
D. Ruffled Feathers: United States v. CITGO Petroleum
Corp. and the Continued Confusion
In line with a more narrow interpretation of the MBTA, in Septem-
ber 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit joined the Eighth
Circuit’s approach when it held in favor of CITGO Petroleum Corpora-
tion by reversing several of CITGO’s environmental infractions, in-
cluding violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.94 Some have
applauded the circuit’s logic, arguing that the legislative history of the
MBTA combined with the statute’s plain language requires such an
interpretation.95 Others believe the court’s failure to recognize inci-
dental killings as punishable under the MBTA is an inappropriate un-
derstanding of both the statute’s plain language and the intent of
Congress when implementing the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty.96
92. Id. To support this proposition, the Ninth Circuit distinguished killing or taking
a bird from merely harming it. Id. The court held that destroying spotted owl
habitats only harmed the migratory bird and reasoned that imposing liability for
such a lengthy causal chain leading to the birds’ death extended the MBTA be-
yond Congress’s intended scope. Id. In the Ninth Circuit’s own words, “ ‘take’ is
defined ‘as to pursue, hunt, shoot, would, kill, trap, capture or collect,’ . . . [mean-
ing] physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct
which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.”
Id. at 302. However, in this opinion, the court also acknowledged a previous hold-
ing within the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F.
Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978), where
the court held a company liable for killing protected birds as a result of misusing
pesticides. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 303.
93. The court in Seattle Audubon Society explained that Corbin Farm Service, which
involved the sanctioning of owners of an alfalfa field for poisoning protected birds
with pesticides, merely stood for the proposition “that the MBTA can ‘constitu-
tionally be applied to impose criminal penalties on those who did not intend to
kill migratory birds,’” Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 303 (quoting Corbin
Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 536), but that the “reasoning of [that case] is inappo-
site” when considering habitat destruction. Id.
94. United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 493 (5th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he MBTA’s text provides no basis, explicitly or implicitly, for criminal-
izing migratory bird deaths because they result from violations of other state or
federal laws.”).
95. See generally Benjamin Means, Note, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences:
The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 824
(1998) (“Extending the MBTA’s reach beyond activity directed at wildlife would
hamper normal land use activities that often result in bird death—such as
farming . . . .”).
96. Ogden, supra note 69, at 11–12 (“[I]ncidental takings are, within certain parame-
ters, a violation of the MBTA.”).
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The CITGO conflict arose when the United States accused CITGO
Petroleum Corporation of violating the MBTA and other environmen-
tal regulations by failing to cover its oil containers at its Corpus
Christi refinery, causing migratory birds to fall into the uncovered
tanks and die.97 Further, because the tanks in question contained
large amounts of oil, authorities determined CITGO was using the
containers as oil–water separators, which, pursuant to environmental
regulations, must be covered.98
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas first tried the
case, ultimately holding that CITGO was responsible for killing pro-
tected migratory birds. Persuaded by the testimony of multiple
CITGO employees who reported bird deaths in the uncovered tanks as
early as the mid-1990s, the lower court found that CITGO “knowingly
operat[ed] [the tanks] . . . without emission control devices” and there-
fore unlawfully caused migratory birds to be killed.99 Thus, it held
that CITGO’s actions constituted an illegal taking of the birds100 and
fined the corporation $45,000 for violating the MBTA on three of five
counts.101 Even though other circuits have held that, historically,
Congress understood the word take to mean only killing birds as a
direct result of hunting,102 the district court emphasized “[t]he fact
that Congress was primarily concerned with hunting does not, how-
ever, indicate that hunting was its sole concern.”103 Because Congress
had previously amended the MBTA’s felony provision under § 707(b)
to include a knowledge requirement back in 1986, in the district
court’s view, Congress purposefully decided not to alter the misde-
meanor section to include a mental culpability requirement at that
time.104 For these reasons, in the realm of misdemeanors, the district
court concluded that the MBTA’s broad language coupled with Con-
gress’s decision to exclude a mens rea standard required the court to
impose criminal penalties for incidental killings.105
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s analy-
sis, supporting its reversal with the Act’s plain language, the legisla-
97. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 480.
98. Id. (stating Subpart QQQ of the Clean Air Act requires equalization tanks to be
covered).
99. Id. at 480–81 (citing United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO I), 893 F.
Supp. 2d 841, 848 (S.D. Tex. 2012)) (summarizing the district court’s findings).
100. CITGO I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
101. Id.
102. See generally Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991).
103. CITGO I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (quoting United States v. Corbin Farm Serv.,
444 F. Supp. 510, 532 (E.D. Cal. 1978)).
104. Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 615 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113,
6128 (noting that potential § 707(a) violations should be evaluated using a strict
liability standard).
105. CITGO I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
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tive history surrounding the word take, and policy considerations.106
First, the court analyzed the MBTA through the lens of the Act’s plain
language.107 The relevant part of the MBTA states:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations . . . it shall be unlawful at any
time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill,
attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter,
barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment . . . any migratory
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not
manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such
bird.108
The court guided its understanding by presuming “absent contrary in-
dications . . . Congress intend[ed] to adopt the common law definition
of statutory terms.”109 With this tool of interpretation in mind, the
court observed that “[t]he term ‘take’ is ‘as old as law itself,’ ”110 con-
cluding that Congress must have meant take to mean only killing or
capturing the birds as a result of an affirmative human action to con-
trol them.111 In other words, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, incidentally
killing the birds by omissions did not constitute a taking under the
MBTA’s plain language.112
Beyond the statute’s plain language, however, the Fifth Circuit
noted that Congress’s failure to amend the MBTA to unambiguously
include incidental killings of migratory birds demonstrated that it did
not intend such actions to be violations of the Act.113 To bolster this
argument, the court observed that even after over fifty years of oppor-
tunity to amend the provision, Congress has still failed to do so.114 In
making this observation, the Fifth Circuit did not address the district
court’s reasoning that Congress already implied its approval for penal-
izing incidental killings under § 707(a) when, in 1986, it redrafted the
mental requirement for felony convictions.115
Instead, the court focused on its disagreement with the govern-
ment’s logic regarding the relevance of a 2002 amendment that ex-
empted “military readiness activities” from MBTA misdemeanor
106. United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 489–94 (5th
Cir. 2015).
107. Id. at 489–91.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
109. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 489 (quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11
(1995)).
110. Id. at 489 (quoting Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 490–91.
114. Id. at 490.
115. Id.; see United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO I), 893 F. Supp. 2d 841,
845–46 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
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liability.116 The court argued that even though Congress decided to
narrowly exempt these incidental military activities from MBTA pen-
alties, this amendment did not mean that all other types of incidental
killings were suddenly violations of the Act.117 In its own words, “[a]
single carve-out from the law cannot mean that the entire coverage of
the MBTA was implicitly and hugely expanded . . . . Congress had no
reason to address the full scope of the MBTA” when it exempted mili-
tary readiness activities.118
During its analysis, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the broad hold-
ings of the Second and Tenth Circuits,119 which have adopted expan-
sive MBTA interpretations that include incidental killing partially
due to the strict liability language of the Act’s misdemeanor provision
and a broad reading of the word take. However, in the CITGO II
court’s view, the strict mental standard found in § 703(a) of the MBTA
does not justify extending the meaning of take to those who inciden-
tally kill protected birds.120
Finally, the Fifth Circuit cited policy considerations when conclud-
ing that MBTA liability did not cover indirect or incidental killings.121
Specifically, the court pointed to the Act’s potentially extensive appli-
cation because it “protects approximately 836 species of birds.”122 An
expansive rule that incorporates incidental killings, in the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s view, would result in an unreasonable number of MBTA viola-
tions, causing “[e]ven domesticated cats [to be] . . . serial violators of
the MBTA.”123 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed the lower court’s holding, absolving CITGO Petroleum Corpo-
ration of three misdemeanor violations of the MBTA and a $45,000
fine because its incidental omissions did not rise to the level of unlaw-
ful MBTA activity.124
III. ANALYSIS: DESPITE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S RULING, THE
MBTA’S LANGUAGE HAS AN EXPANSIVE WINGSPAN
The Fifth Circuit’s decision, which refused to apply the MBTA’s
misdemeanor provision to circumstances beyond directly taking the
protected birds by hunting or another related, affirmative act, improp-
erly disregarded the MBTA’s expansive language, the congressional
116. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 490; see Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002).
117. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 490.
118. Id. at 491.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 490–92.
121. Id. (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY: MANY
HUMAN-CAUSED THREATS AFFLICT OUR BIRD POPULATIONS 2 (2002)).
122. Id. at 493.
123. Id. at 494.
124. Id.
2018] UNITED STATES V. CITGO PETROLEUM CORP. 759
intent surrounding the Act, and persuasive policy considerations that
support expanding MBTA sanctions to include incidental killing.
A. The Sky Is the Limit: The MBTA’s Language and
Legislative History Support Sanctioning Incidental
Takings of Protected Birds
The MBTA’s language is expansive, commanding:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided
in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, order to purchase, purchase,
deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or
imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported,
carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage,
or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any
product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in
whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof.125
Initially, it was well accepted that the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty
and, by extension, the MBTA, were implemented in order to prevent
hunters and poachers from exterminating migratory birds that were
only temporarily hosted by the United States or Canada.126 There is
equally little dispute, however, that the Treaty also intended to im-
pose an obligation on both the United States and Great Britain to pro-
tect migratory birds that are “of great value as a source of food or in
destroying insects which are injurious to forests and forage plants on
the public domain, as well as to agricultural crops, in both the United
States and Canada.”127 Thus, Congress likely implemented the Treaty
into U.S. law using expansive language,128 quoted above, to ensure
the Fish and Wildlife Service had broad statutory support when en-
forcing the treaty to protect the migratory birds.
1. Taking a Different Direction: The MBTA’s Plain Language
Supports Misdemeanor Penalties for Incidental
Takings
In order to ensure faithful execution of the duties imposed on the
United States by the U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, Congress adopted the
MBTA, and in doing so, included extensive language regarding which
125. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
126. See generally, e.g., U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, proclamation; United
States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO I), 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843 (S.D. Tex.
2012) (“The fact that Congress was primarily concerned with hunting does not,
however, indicate that hunting was its sole concern.”).
127. U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, proclamation.
128. See § 703(a) (stating broadly that “it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means
or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture”
(emphasis added)).
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types of human activities constituted violations.129 The Supreme
Court has commanded that, when beginning statutory analysis in the
absence of ambiguity within the text, the law being interpreted should
be read consistent with its plain language.130 For the purposes of this
analysis, the MBTA contains two relevant sections: the definition sec-
tion under § 703(a) that explains which types of interferences consti-
tute MBTA violations and the misdemeanor penalty provision under
§ 707(a), which outlines the mental culpability standard for misde-
meanor violations and provides details regarding appropriate
sanctions.131
Section 703(a) of the MBTA instructs that “it shall be unlawful at
any time, by any means or in any manner” to take or kill a protected
bird.132 Even though the original U.S.–Great Britain Treaty only dis-
cussed hunting and shipping of the birds,133 Congress nevertheless
chose to carry out the Treaty’s purpose by enacting the MBTA using
more expansive language. In fact, in the CITGO case, the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas penalized CITGO in part be-
cause, in its view, “[t]he fact that Congress was primarily concerned
with hunting does not, however, indicate that hunting was its sole
concern.”134 Congress’s decision to include broad language in the
MBTA’s provisions aligns with the legislature’s persistent efforts to
pass laws, even as soon as the early twentieth century, that encourage
bird-conservation efforts.135
The language involved with § 703(a), however, only sets forth
which actions violate the MBTA.136 The misdemeanor penalty provi-
129. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012).
130. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
131. Compare § 703(a) (“it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any man-
ner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture . . . .” (emphasis
added)), with § 707(a) (“[A]ny person, association, partnership, or corporation
who shall violate any provisions of [the MBTA] shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor.”).
132. § 703(a) (emphasis added).
133. U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, arts. II, VI.
134. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO I), 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843
(S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510,
532 (E.D. Cal. 1978)).
135. See Coggins & Patti, supra note 21, at 169–74 (outlining the history of Congress’s
environmental legislation leading up to the MBTA, including the Lacey Act,
which gave states jurisdiction to penalize poachers that carry birds outside of
their state borders, and the Weeks-McLean Act, which stated that all migratory
birds were under United States control and custody); see Lilley & Firestone,
supra note 22, at 1178 (discussing public shock regarding the extermination of
birds for frivolous items such as for feathers on women’s hats).
136. § 703(a).
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sion of the Act, which is found in § 707(a), further demonstrates the
MBTA’s broad plain language.137 The section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, partner-
ship, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said conventions or of
this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation
made pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be impris-
oned not more than six months, or both.138
Because § 707(a) does not include a mens rea requirement on its
face,139 courts have held it requires strict liability. Strict liability of-
fenses are, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, crimes
“that do not require the defendant to know the facts that make his
conduct illegal which do not require a showing of specific intent or
guilty knowledge.”140
In order to properly interpret §§ 703(a) and 707(a), the provisions
must first be read carefully in light of the Supreme Court’s require-
ment that, absent ambiguity in the text, courts must read and apply a
statute’s plain meaning.141 When doing so, the MBTA’s language is
remarkably clear. The language of §§ 703 and 707 provides that it is
unlawful “at any time, by any means or in any manner” to take or kill
a protected bird,142 and those “who shall violate any provisions . . . of
this Act . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon convic-
tion thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 [per violation].”143
Thus, pursuant to this plain language, killing a protected bird by any
137. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012); see also  16 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (providing the
statutory basis for convictions regarding baiting of migratory birds); id. § 707(b)
(2012) (providing the statutory language for the MBTA’s felony violations).
138. § 707(a) (emphasis added).
139. See § 707(a).
140. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994).
141. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (“If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Con-
gress. . . . [But] [t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congres-
sionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con-
gress. . . . We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer.” (second omission in original) (citations and quotations omitted)).
The Fish and Wildlife Service has taken the position that incidental takings of
protected migratory birds are violations of the act. See Executive Orders: Conser-
vation of Migratory Birds—Questions and Answers, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/executive-orders.php [https://
perma.unl.edu/6CPQ-BS9C] (last updated Sept. 22, 2015) (“Existing migratory
bird permit regulations . . . do not authorize take resulting from activities such as
forestry or agricultural operations, construction or operation of powerlines, and
other activities where an otherwise legal action might reasonably be expected to
take migratory birds, but is not the intended purpose of the action.”).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
143. § 707(a) (emphasis added).
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means, including failing to cover an oil tank and causing bird deaths
like in the CITGO case, is a violation of the MBTA.144
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with this strict liability reading
of § 707(a) for misdemeanors, it failed to properly acknowledge the
language of § 703, “by any means or in any manner.”145 Instead, the
court focused its analysis on defining the meaning of the word take
under the MBTA, holding that it only extended to its old common law
definition because of the Act’s legislative history.146 Therefore, in the
court’s view, a taking meant only to “reduce . . . animals, by killing or
capturing, to human control”147 by any means or in any manner. Once
it concluded take applied exclusively to hunting and capturing,148 the
court held incidental killings could not be takings under the MBTA’s
plain language.149 By diving into an analysis regarding the definition
of take, however, the court overreached its goal of merely interpreting
the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, which clearly
commands that killing a protected bird “by any means or in any man-
ner” violates the MBTA.150 Effectively, the Fifth Circuit entangled its
plain-meaning analysis with an evaluation of Congress’s intent
through the Act’s legislative history; thus, instead of acknowledging
that the MBTA’s text lacks ambiguity and applying the statute’s plain
language, it began legislating from the bench.
2. Under Congress’s Wing: The MBTA’s Legislative History
Supports MBTA Penalties for Misdemeanor Incidental
Takings
While the Act’s plain language directly and unambiguously autho-
rizes misdemeanor penalties for those who incidentally take MBTA
protected animals,151 it is not the only source that supports this pro-
position.  The Act’s legislative history further emphasizes that the
statute’s proper interpretation is one that extends liability to indirect
as well as direct takings of protected migratory birds.152
144. See §§ 703(a), 707(a).
145. § 703(a) (emphasis added).
146. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 489 (5th Cir.
2015).
147. Id. (quoting Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
148. Id. at 490–91.
149. Id. at 494.
150. See § 703(a); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)
(“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
151. See 16 U.S.C.§ 707(a) (2012).
152. Scott W. Brunner, The Prosecutor’s Vulture: Inconsistent MBTA Prosecution, Its
Clash with Wind Farms, And How to Fix It, 3 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2013);
see §§ 703(a), 707(a).
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In the Fifth Circuit’s view, according to the Act’s legislative his-
tory, the strict liability language found in § 707(a) applies only to
hunting activities; therefore, the concept of taking protected birds can-
not be expanded to migratory birds that incidentally drown in CITGO
Petroleum’s uncovered oil tanks because neither Congress’s express
language nor the Act’s legislative history supports broadening the
meaning of take beyond its common law definition.153
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit heavily
emphasized the differences between the words take and harm when
concluding that take under the Act encompassed only direct hunt-
ing.154 It drew this conclusion by comparing the MBTA to a similar
piece of environmental legislation, the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
which Congress passed a few years before the MBTA was amended in
1986 to require knowledge for MBTA felony convictions.155 In doing
so, the court argued that the language of the ESA included the concept
of harm, which implied that, under the ESA, incidental interference
with protected animals could be penalized.156 The court then com-
pared the ESA to the MBTA to demonstrate that, under the MBTA,
Congress intended the term take to be strictly consistent with its
traditional, common law definition, which meant to “re-
duce . . . animals, by killing or capturing, to human control.”157 Other-
wise, according to the Fifth Circuit, Congress would have amended
§ 703(a) of the MBTA in 1986 to include a term similar to harm,
thereby implying that indirect killings were also MBTA violations.158
The court concluded that Congress’s failure to amend the Act demon-
strated that it understood how to expand the common law definition of
the word take to indirect situations and desired not to do so.159
What the Fifth Circuit’s analysis failed to address, however, is that
when Congress amended the MBTA felony provision in 1986, it proba-
bly knew that the Act had already been broadly interpreted to penal-
ize activity resulting in incidental takings of protected birds.160 A
153. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 481.
154. Id. at 490.
155. See S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113,
6128.
156. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 489–91.
157. Id. 489–90.
158. Id. at 490.
159. Id. (stating that “Congress . . . knew how to expand ‘take’ beyond its common law
origins to include accidental or indirect harm to animals” because of its previous
amendments to the ESA).
160. As discussed infra, at this point in history, at least three courts had interpreted
the misdemeanor provision of the MBTA to allow sanctions for incidental killings.
See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding a corpora-
tion liable for accidentally killing protected migratory birds with a toxic waste-
water pond even though that corporation had taken a number of preventative
measures to keep the protected birds away from the water); N. Slope Borough v.
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Senate report addressing the statute’s 1986 amendment expressly
stated that “nothing in this amendment [of the felony provision] is in-
tended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor prosecu-
tions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in
many Federal court decisions.”161
As noted in this 1986 report, many federal-court decisions had in
fact resolved the interpretation question of § 703(a) of the MBTA.162
At that point in history, the federal-court decisions Congress was re-
ferring to included holdings from the Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond163 and Ninth164 Circuits, and the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.165 Each of these courts held, between 1978 and
1980, that incidental takings or killings of migratory birds were viola-
tions of the MBTA’s misdemeanor provision.
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 361–62 (D.D.C. 1980) (“The provisions of this Act apply
to the killing of birds ‘by any means or in any manner’ even if the killing was not
intentional.” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1976)); United States v. Corbin Farm
Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1978) (holding that MBTA violations occurred when over one thousand protected
birds were incidentally killed as a result of feeding in an alfalfa field sprayed
with pesticide); infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
161. S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128;
see also S. REP. NO. 105–366, at 3 (1998) (“The elimination of strict liability, how-
ever, applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not intended in
any way to reflect upon the general application of strict liability under the
MBTA.”). After the Senate published this report, courts analyzing the MBTA
have accepted that there is little room for debate regarding the misdemeanor sec-
tion’s mental culpability requirement—the provision commands a strict liability
analysis. See generally United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. (CITGO II), 801
F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The act imposes strict liability on violators, pun-
ishable by a maximum $15,000 fine and six months imprisonment.” (citing 16
U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012)).
162. S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128.
But see United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) (stating in dicta that
“the views of one Congress as to the meaning of an Act passed by an earlier Con-
gress” should not be afforded great weight). While the Supreme Court has stated
that these reports should not be afforded great weight, the comments surround-
ing these documents are Congress’s last word about the meaning of § 703(a) and
generally align with the language of the MBTA. See H.R. REP. NO. 65–243, at 2–3
(1918) (supplying a letter to President Woodrow Wilson urging him to sign the
MBTA to preserve the birds from insecticide).
163. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding a corporation
liable for accidentally killing protected migratory birds with a toxic waste-water
pond even though that corporation had taken a number of preventative measures
to keep the protected birds away from the water).
164. United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.) (holding that
MBTA violations occurred when over one thousand protected birds were inciden-
tally killed as a result of feeding in an alfalfa field sprayed with pesticide), aff’d
on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
165. N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 361–62 (D.D.C. 1980) ( “The provi-
sions of this Act apply to the killing of birds ‘by any means or in any manner’ even
if the killing was not intentional.” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1976)).
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Even further, when a federal appellate court finally slightly di-
verged from the broad rule established by the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits, it was in the early 1990s when the Ninth Circuit clarified that it
was inappropriate to sanction habitat destruction, even under
§ 707(a)’s strict liability standard.166 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged its previous precedent in United States v. Corbin Farm
Services and decided not to overrule it.167 Instead, the court held that
habitat destruction, which in its view was not an MBTA violation even
under the broad misdemeanor provision, was “inapposite” to killing
birds with pesticides in an alfalfa field.168 Therefore, the court justi-
fied its earlier decision to include misdemeanor sanctions for individu-
als or corporate entitles that killed birds indirectly with pesticide.169
Setting the Ninth Circuit’s narrow decision aside, the first federal
appellate-court decision to unconditionally hold that MBTA violations
required directly killing the protected birds through activities associ-
ated with hunting did not surface until 1997 when the Eighth Circuit
held, “Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters
and poachers. But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on
conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the
deaths of migratory birds.”170
While this Eighth Circuit decision was being litigated, Congress
was in the process of drafting yet another amendment to the MBTA.
This modification changed the mental culpability requirement for
baiting in unauthorized areas from strict liability to a standard of
knew or should have known.171 After introducing the bill’s draft in
1997, Congress voted to amend this baiting provision in 1998, which is
codified in § 704(b).172 The U.S. Senate Committee Report acknowl-
edged that, up until this change to the baiting requirement, “offenses
166. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the
district court properly held that though “the MBTA can ‘constitutionally be ap-
plied to impose criminal penalties on those who did not intend to kill migratory
birds,’” that reasoning “is inapposite” to cases involving habitat destruction
(quoting Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 536)).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 536). The Ninth Circuit believed
habitat destruction was inapposite to directly killing migratory birds with pesti-
cide because habitat destruction merely harmed the protected animals as op-
posed to actually killing them. Id.
169. Id.
170. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers.
But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of reason to construe
it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such as timber harvesting, that
indirectly results in the death of migratory birds.”).
171. Id.
172. S. REP. NO. 105–366, at 2 (1998); see 16 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (providing the
statutory authority for criminalizing baiting of migratory birds).
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under the MBTA were strict liability, a hallmark of the law.”173 Fur-
ther, the report noted that this “elimination of strict liability, however,
applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not in-
tended in any way to reflect upon the general application of strict lia-
bility under the MBTA.”174
During this 1998 amendment process, Congress may have been
aware of the recent circuit split between the older Second and Ninth
Circuit opinions allowing indirect takings and the more recent Eight
Circuit opinion requiring direct, affirmative action to find an MBTA
misdemeanor violation.175 Still, the legislature did not overturn the
older, broad decisions of the federal circuit courts in favor of the more
recent, yet narrower Eighth Circuit176 opinion.177 By failing to correct
the Eight Circuit’s application of the MBTA, proponents of restricting
MBTA liability to include only affirmative activities might argue that
the 1998 committee was expressing support for the newer Eighth Cir-
cuit decision to sanction only direct, affirmative actions toward the
protected birds. Unlike the previous 1986 amendment, however, the
report neither expressly cited to the language of § 703(a) nor refer-
enced any recent court decisions dealing with § 703(a).178 Therefore, it
is likely that the 1998 amendment’s purpose was narrowly tailored to
address the baiting issue in § 704 without taking the time to even con-
sider, much less correct, the Eight Circuit’s misinterpretation of the
law.179 For these reasons, even though the Eighth Circuit adopted a
narrow reading of § 703(a) shortly before Congress considered a differ-
ent provision of the MBTA, it is unlikely that this situation is an ex-
ample of Congress acquiescing to the rule embraced by the Eight
Circuit.
Even further, a few years later, Congress amended the Act to ex-
empt military readiness activities from MBTA liability when it passed
173. S. REP. NO. 105–366, at 2.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Compare United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding a
corporation liable for accidentally killing protected migratory birds with a toxic
waste-water pond even though that corporation had taken a number of prevent-
ative measures to keep the protected birds away from the water), with Newton
Cty. 113 F.3d at 115 (“Strict liability may be appropriate when dealing with
hunters and poachers. But it would stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct,
such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory
birds.”).
176. Newton Cty., 113 F.3d at 115.
177. See generally FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 902; United States v. Corbin Farm Servs.,
444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
178. S. REP. NO. 105–366, at 2 (1998).
179. Id. at 3 (“The elimination of strict liability, however, applies only to hunting with
bait or over baited areas, and is not intended in any way to reflect upon the gen-
eral application of strict liability under the MBTA.”).
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the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act.180 Congress
passed this Act in response to sanctions imposed on the U.S. military
by the District Court for the District of Columbia—the court held that
military activities unlawfully violated the MBTA when they caused
protected migratory birds to die accidentally during training.181 The
Act gave the Department of the Interior power to “prescribe regula-
tions to exempt the Armed Forces for the incidental taking of migra-
tory birds during military readiness activities.”182 By determining
that incidental-taking exceptions were necessary to avoid MBTA lia-
bility, Congress yet again demonstrated that the MBTA’s misde-
meanor provision extended beyond mere hunting into the realm of
indirect taking or killing of migratory birds.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attempted
to reconcile its decision with the MBTA’s military preparedness
amendment by stating: “A single carve-out from the law cannot mean
that the entire coverage of the MBTA was implicitly and hugely ex-
panded. . . . By proceeding in a carefully targeted way, Congress had
no reason to address the full scope of the MBTA.”183 However, the
Fifth Circuit failed to consider this amendment in light of the statute’s
plain language and other legislative history that support a broader
reading of the statute.
The language of §§ 703 and 707 provides that it is unlawful “at any
time, by any means or in any manner” to take or kill a protected
bird,184 and those “who shall violate any provisions . . . of this
Act . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 [per violation].”185 The
statute unambiguously calls for misdemeanor penalties when pro-
tected migratory birds are indirectly taken or killed. And if, despite
this clear language, Congress truly believed that take or kill meant
only the common law meaning of the word, it would have amended
§ 703(a) back in 1986 or during any other subsequent amendment pro-
cess to ensure the language clearly applied solely to direct taking or
180. See Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002).
181. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 (D.D.C. 2002). Note
that the Fish and Wildlife Service, which is the administrative body that enforces
the MBTA, refused to grant the military an MBTA permit, which resulted in
these violations. See id. at 163; see also 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (“The Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to adopt such measures as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act.”).
182. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, at § 315(d).
183. United States v. CITGO Petroleum, Inc. (CITGO II), 801 F.3d 477, 491 (5th Cir.
2015).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
185. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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killing.186 This action would have invalidated several federal appel-
late-court decisions that have held incidental killings could be penal-
ized as misdemeanor violations.187 Further, Congress would not have
determined that incidental-taking exceptions were necessary in any
circumstance if it desired the MBTA to only be applicable to affirma-
tive human activity directed at reducing the birds to human con-
trol.188 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. CITGO
Petroleum, Inc., is not only founded on an imprecise reading of the
MTBA’s plain language but also a misunderstanding of the Act’s legis-
lative history.
B. Migrating in the Right Direction: Persuasive Policy
Considerations for Sanctioning Incidental Killings
1. Compliance at 5000 Feet: International Obligations and
Department of the Interior’s Regulations
Despite the Fifth Circuit’s determination that misdemeanor penal-
ties under the MBTA do not extend to incidental killings of the
birds,189 there are several persuasive policy considerations in favor of
enforcing MBTA sanctions against both direct and indirect takings of
protected birds. President Bill Clinton recognized the importance of
protecting migratory birds when he stated:
Migratory birds are of great ecological and economic value to this country and
to other countries. They contribute to biological diversity and bring tremen-
dous enjoyment to millions of Americans who study, watch, feed, or hunt these
birds throughout the United States and other countries. The United States
has recognized the critical importance of this shared resource by ratifying in-
ternational, bilateral conventions for the conservation of migratory
birds. . . . These migratory bird conventions impose substantive obligations on
the United States for the conversation of migratory birds and their habitats,
and through the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Act), the United States has imple-
mented these migratory bird conventions with the respect to the United
States.190
In line with this reasoning, in the words of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “[t]here is no reason to treat
186. Congress also might have defined the meaning of the word “direct” killing or tak-
ing, which has also caused interpretation issues in the federal courts. Compare
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding a corporation
liable for killing protected migratory birds with a toxic waste-water pond because
such activity was directed at the protect birds), with Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding activities directed
at protected birds means activities associated with hunting).
187. See generally N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FMC
Corp., 572 F.2d at 902; United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510
(E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d at 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
188. See CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 489.
189. See id.
190. Exec. Order No. 13,186, 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 10, 2001).
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the Act differently from the Treaty since the legislation was meant to
‘give effect to the convention between the United States and Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds.’”191 The U.S.–Great Brit-
ain Treaty was ratified because of wide spread, international concern
regarding the longevity of migratory birds. Thus, the United States
has an international obligation to take measures to protect migratory
birds that are only temporarily hosted on American territory, regard-
less of the manner in which the birds are taken or killed.
Even further, the Department of the Interior, through its agency
the Fish and Wildlife Service, contends that the MBTA allows sanc-
tions for incidental takings and killings of protected birds, and has
stated that it is “the Service’s longstanding position that the MBTA
applies to [takings] that [occur] incidental to . . . otherwise lawful ac-
tivity.”192 For this reason, the Fish and Wildlife Service has imple-
mented, under congressional orders, special-use permits to authorize
incidental taking of protected migratory birds in circumstances like
military readiness activities for actions that would otherwise be
illegal.193
While the policies of regulatory institutions do not provide binding
legal precedent, the Department of the Interior’s interpretation
through the Fish and Wildlife Service provides additional support for
interpreting the MBTA’s misdemeanor sanctions to include indirect as
well as direct taking and killing of protected birds.194 Because Con-
gress has promulgated authority to the Fish and Wildlife Service to
implement and enforce the MBTA,195 the Service’s decision to recom-
mend prosecution for incidental-takings cases is another factor that
supports reading the MBTA to include incidental activities.196
191. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cita-
tion omitted).
192. Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 80
Fed. Reg. 30,032-01 (proposed May 26, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21).
193. The military readiness amendment to the MBTA is known as the Bob Stump
National Defense Authorization Act. See Bob Stump National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002). It made
military readiness exempt from MBTA sanctions for incidental takings. See id.
§ 315(d) (requiring the Department of the Interior to “prescribe regulations to
exempt the Armed Forces for the incidental taking of migratory birds during mili-
tary readiness activities”). But see CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 490 (interpreting the
military-readiness-activities amendment to the MBTA to “not extend to the ‘oper-
ation of industrial facilities.’”).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682–83 (10th Cir.
2010) (demonstrating the Fish and Wildlife Service’s policy to sanction incidental
MBTA takings and killings by explaining that it included a grace period before
sanctioning MBTA violators for incidental industrial killings of migratory birds
who frequently got trapped in heaters).
195. See 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012).
196. See, e.g., Apollo Energies, 611 F.3d at 679; see also W. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE MI-
GRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT, THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT, AND
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2. Not Just Winging It: Extending Violations of the MBTA to
Include Incidental Killing Does Not Risk
Inappropriate Sanctions
After it concluded that the MBTA’s plain language and legislative
history did not permit sanctioning indirect killings or takings of mi-
gratory birds, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited what it
believed were important policy considerations supporting its refusal to
extend the MBTA’s misdemeanor provision beyond direct, affirmative
actions resulting in the deaths of protected migratory birds. According
to the Fifth Circuit:
[B]etween 97 and 976 million birds are killed annually by running into win-
dows. Communcation towers kill an additional four to five million birds each
year . . . . Cars may kill approximately 60 million birds each year. Even do-
mesticated cats are serial violators of the MBTA. In Wisconsin alone, the gov-
ernment estimates that domesticated cats kill 39 million birds.197
Even assuming these statistics are accurate, the court overstates
the issue by suggesting that domesticated cats, owners of skyscrapers,
and individuals driving cars will be sanctioned under a broader inter-
pretation of the misdemeanor provision. Because enforcement of the
MBTA is vested with the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wild-
life Service,198 only realistic prosecutions for taking migratory birds
will be pursued.199 It is impractical to suggest that this agency, whose
duty is to implement the MBTA’s larger purpose of protecting migra-
tory birds,200 would waste its resources on frivolous investigations
into domesticated cats. Additionally, scholars have suggested solu-
tions that would diminish the Fifth Circuit’s concern, such as inciden-
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: PROHIBITIONS AND REMEDIES (2014), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resources/2014/
10/22nd-fall-conference/course_materials/13-young_michael-pa-
per.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RE4C-J8AU] (describing the rela-
tionship between “taking” prohibitions and exceptions of the MBTA, the Eagle
Act, and the ESA within the context of the incidental take of wildlife).
197. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 484 (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD
MORTALITY: MANY HUMAN-CAUSED THREATS AFFLICT OUR BIRD POPULATIONS 2
(2002)).
198. See 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to adopt
such measures as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.”).
199. CITGO II, 801 F.3d at 484 (([B]etween 97 and 976 million birds are killed annu-
ally by running into windows. Communcation towers kill an additional four to
five million birds each year . . . . Cars may kill approximately 60 million birds
each year. Even domesticated cats are serial violators of the MBTA. In Wisconsin
alone, the government estimates that domesticated cats kill 39 million birds.”
(citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY: MANY HUMAN-
CAUSED THREATS AFFLICT OUR BIRD POPULATIONS 2 (2002)). Instead of wasting
resources prosecuting everyday citizens for unavoidable contact with the migra-
tory birds, the Fish and Wildlife Service will be investigating and prosecuting
harmful practices, such as failing to cover oil tanks when it would be relatively
costless to do so.
200. See § 701; U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, supra note 3, proclamation.
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tal-take permits that would be administered through the Fish and
Wildlife Service.201
Even if, however, the Fifth Circuit is correct in asserting that in-
terpreting the MBTA’s misdemeanor provision broadly will result in
sanctions for these innocent activities,202 the court overstepped its
bound by improperly legislating when it forced the MBTA’s plain lan-
guage and legislative history to comply with the court’s beliefs that
sanctioning incidental killings would result in a slippery slope of lia-
bility. In the event that the MBTA imposes unintended and wide-
spread consequences for these innocent activities, it is the job of the
legislature to amend the statute’s plain language to correct the issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the United States finally succeeded in passing an environ-
mental regulation regarding migratory birds by implementing the
U.S.–Great Britain Treaty, it intended to broadly protect migratory
birds to ensure that these animals did not go extinct as a result of
human interference.203 Since Congress passed the MBTA, however,
the federal circuits have stood divided on how far the strict liability
language in the Act’s misdemeanor provision extends. While the
MBTA’s plain language and legislative history support a broad inter-
pretation, the Fifth Circuit still refused to acknowledge that indirect
actions merited misdemeanor convictions.204 By absolving CITGO Pe-
troleum Corporation of three misdemeanor convictions under the
MBTA, the court effectively excused the corporation’s harmful indus-
try practice. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit set a dangerous precedent
that corporations need not worry themselves over their influence on
the environment, specifically their impact on protected migratory
birds.
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